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Most importantly, as Maneesha Deckha notes, the legal personhood for animals 
should be abandoned as a goal because it is steeped in “exclusionary” and “reductive” 
biases. Throughout its history the concept of personhood, with its rationalist bent, has 
traditionally excluded women and people of color admitting, until relatively recently, 
only white men into its fold. While personhood is no longer limited to white men, it 
will be forever marred by these constitutive prejudices, it is therefore an unlikely ve-
hicle for progressive change.7 
 
Ultimately, while Thompson raises an interesting question about how enabling science 
and law to communicate more effectively might make it easier to secure rights for 
great apes, the personhood argument upon which he relies, and its ‘like us’ bias, seem 
to carry more risks than benefits for advancing apes’ and other animals’ rights. 
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Missing the Apes of the Trees for the Forest 
 
Carlo Alvaro 
 
The debate over ape personhood is of great social and moral importance. For more 
than twenty-five years, attorney Steven Wise has been arguing that animals who have 
cognitive complexities similar to humans should be legally granted basic rights of au-
tonomy. In my view, granting personhood status and other rights to great apes are at-
tainable goals. But how should we go about it? My worry is that Thompson’s suggest-
ed strategy relies on Kantian ethics, in particular on Kant’s notion of autonomy. In 
fact, I am worried about Kantian ethics in general because of its influence on morality 
and ultimately on our legal system. The problem is that Kant’s ethical system is rather 
strict because, accordingly, only those beings that have a rational nature can constrain 
us morally. By rational nature, Kant referred to one’s capacity to govern one’s self by 
autonomous, rational choice. Humans are rational beings and thus are morally im-
portant; they are ends-in-themselves because they are autonomous and capable of un-
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derstanding and legislating moral laws. Of course, not all humans are rational. There 
are the so-called marginal cases, small children, the feeble minded, and more, who are 
not autonomous. We may speculate as to what Kant might have thought of such indi-
viduals, but he never addressed the issue. Unfortunately for animals, Kant regarded 
them as mere means to our ends because they cannot govern themselves by autono-
mous rational choice. For Kant, Animals are objects without intrinsic moral value. In 
his Lecture on Ethics (1779), Kant said:  “But so far as animals are concerned, we 
have no direct duties. Animals are not self-conscious and are there merely as the 
means to an end. That end is man” (Kant, 239-241). Consequently, humans do not 
have direct moral obligations toward animals. 
Some Neo-Kantians argue that the view propounded by Kant can still speak in favor 
of animals. For example, Christine Korsgaard argues that Kant conflates two concep-
tions of “end-in-itself.” One is the source of normative claims recognized by all ra-
tional agents. And the other is someone who is able to give force to a claim by partici-
pation in morality. Animals cannot be ends-in-themselves in the second sense because 
they lack rationality and autonomy. But it does not follow that animals cannot be 
ends-in-themselves in the first sense: “there is no sense in which they can obligate us” 
(Korsgaard, 21). 
Korsgaard points out that as rational beings, we do not legislate, for example, against 
being lied to, being injured, being cheated on, etc., only because we are autonomous 
and rational beings, but also – perhaps most importantly – because bad things can as-
sault our animal nature. In other words, “we object to pain and torture or injury be-
cause they are bad for us as animal beings” (28). Kant himself held that respect for our 
rational nature involves respecting our animal nature. This is the ground for his 
arguments about our duties to ourselves, our self-preservation, the enjoyment of food, 
and sex. In the Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Kant discusses duties to ourselves as 
animal beings with respect to our animal nature. He covers the duties not to commit 
suicide, not to maim or disfigure oneself, not to masturbate, and more. Also, in Reli-
gion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793), Kant argues that our animal na-
ture is one of three “original predispositions to good in human nature” (Kant, 74). 
Thus animal nature is important. However, did Kant overlook the implications of his 
own principle regarding animals? I think not. Having an animal nature may be a suffi-
cient condition for having direct duties to other rational beings – but not a necessary 
condition. Our animal nature is, after all, “attached” to, comes with, a rational nature; 
but animals (according to Kant) are completely devoid of a rational nature. There is no 
clear textual evidence that Kant overlooked the possibility that animal nature be a 
source of normativity. Furthermore, there is no textual evidence that Kant would re-
gard animal nature alone as important enough to regard animals as ends-in-
themselves.  
The fundamental problem with Kant’s moral view is that it is ultimately concerned 
with notions of obligation and right conduct. The problem is the very conception of 
morality as a set of universal and authoritative norms by which all moral agents are 
categorically obligated to follow. My position is that such a conception of morality is 
defective; it is the very reason why nowadays animal advocates and lawyers have to 
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fight for animal rights. Deontology (and consequentialism as well, by the way) tells us 
to view the world from an individualistic point of view where one calculates what is 
right. Morality in my view is not about ourselves and how we use our individual re-
flections to derive categorically imperative norms. Rather, it is about relationship, care 
for others, and compassion. Thus, I question the concept of granting personhood on 
the basis of whether the animal in question is human-like. 
  
My feeling about duty morality and the Kantian concept of autonomy is that they 
seem plausible in theory, but fail in practice. Our moral outlook toward the environ-
ment, I want to suggest, has been disciplined by deontic (and utilitarian) principles. 
Such theories force us to accept the false dichotomy of individuals as rational or not 
rational; and make us wonder about our rational duty toward others. If we employ this 
kind of ethic to frame our moral questions, we find ourselves arguing abstractly about 
duty and rights, while missing other important aspects of morality, such as compas-
sion, care, relationship, and the acquisition of good moral character. Thus, I do not 
find it surprising that we currently face an environmental crisis and that we have to 
prove that animals are morally important.  
 
An alternative approach to morality is virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is primarily focused 
on good moral character. It suggests that we should approach morality by doing what 
is honest, charitable, compassionate, and do not do what is dishonest, uncharitable, 
and callous. Knowing right from wrong first requires cultivation of our moral charac-
ter. We should acquire virtues such as temperance, justice, and compassion, and prac-
tice temperate, just, and compassionate acts, at the right time and for the right reason. 
If the virtue ethics approach is right, we should abandon deontic and consequentialist 
principles and do what we can to acquire those virtues, and teach them to our children, 
in the hope that future generations may revert the environmental damage that has al-
ready been done and the speciesist bias that society has toward animals. In my view it 
is a virtuous character – and not the Kantian notion of autonomy – that will enable us 
to regard all animals as morally important and not as property. 
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▬ 
 
Peter Woodford 
 
Let me first thank Shawn Thompson for his thoughtful and fascinating essay that takes 
us to the front lines in legal battles over protections for apes. I am grateful for the op-
portunity to comment, and here I would like to focus on the concept of autonomy and 
on both the promise and peril of tying this notion too closely to the philosophy of Im-
manuel Kant in considerations of animal rights. 
